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PUTTING I-THOUGHTS TO WORK 
Abstract. A traditional view holds that the self-concept is essentially indexical. In a highly influential 
article, Ruth Millikan famously held that the self-concept should be understood as a Millian name 
with a sui generis functional role. This article presents a novel explanatory argument against the 
Millian view and in favor of the indexical view. The argument starts from a characterization of the 
self-concept as a device of information integration. It then shows that the indexical view yields a 
better explanation of the integration function than the Millian view. The resulting account can 
rebut Millikan’s objections and it has broader implications for the debate on the essential indexical. 
Keywords. I-concept; first person; mental indexicals; essential indexical.   
 
An angry teacher once screamed: “Please, leave the room!” I looked around. There was Laura, who 
always had good grades. There was Paul, the teacher’s nephew. And there was me, who had been 
struggling to follow the history class. I thought He is talking to me and decided to leave the room. 
Thoughts of this form—I-thoughts—feature tokens of the self-concept, a concept we typically 
express with different forms of the first-person pronoun (“I,” “me,” “mine,” and “myself”) and the 
inflexion of the verb, as in Descartes’ cogito.1  
A traditional view analyzes the self-concept as an indexical concept.2 Unfortunately, this 
traditional view has been attacked from various fronts. In a highly influential article, Ruth Millikan 
famously held that there are no mental indexicals. Focusing on the first person, she suggested that 
the self-concept is a Millian name. On her view, what distinguishes the self-name from ordinary 
names has nothing to do with indexicality; what makes the self-name special is its functional role in 
our mental life.3 
To work as an indexical, the self-concept should have a semantics sufficiently similar to the 
semantics of linguistic indexicals like “I,” “this,” “here,” and “now.” However, a number of reasons 
seem to speak against this approach. To illustrate, linguistic indexicals shift their reference from 
context to context. By contrast, the self-concept does not seem to shift its reference from context to 
context. Plausibly enough, all my tokens of the self-concept refer to me and nobody else.  
I shall come back to the no-shift objection in Section VI. Furthermore, I shall concede that 
we might need to posit a self-name to do some explanatory work. I shall argue, however, that we 
have good reasons to construe the self-concept as an indexical concept. On the view I advocate, we 
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have a self-concept whose reference is fixed by a reflexive rule (RR): A token of I in a thinking 
stands for the subject of that thinking. The conceptual tools I will deploy won’t demonstrate that it is 
RR¾and not another indexical rule¾that provides the right semantics for the self-concept. Still, 
these conceptual tools will put pressure on the Millian view and lend substantial support to the 
indexical view. 
The article proceeds as follows. In sections I-II, I offer a reconstruction of the contrast 
between the Millian view and the indexical view. Section III provides a partial characterization of the 
functional role of the self-concept. The key idea is that the self-concept functions as a device of 
information integration. Sections IV-V present an explanatory argument against the Millian view and 
in favor of the indexical view. This explanatory argument differs from previous arguments in a key 
respect. Instead of focusing on intuitions about the incompleteness of some non-indexical 
explanations, it applies some explanatory tools from the literature on mental representation to the 
self-concept. These tools spell out the idea that the semantic rules of a representation-type are the 
rules that best explain why that representation-type successfully fulfills its (broad) functional role. I 
will suggest that an indexical rule like RR yields a better explanation of some forms of information 
integration than the Millian rules that determine the reference of Millian names. Section VI responds 
to some objections and Section VII draws some morals for the debate on the essential indexical. 
 Before diving in, let me flag some important assumptions and terminological decisions. I 
shall use “concept” to denote a type of mental representation that can be shared by different 
subjects and can participate in inference. One could construe thoughts either as representations in a 
Fodorian language of thought4 or as internalized linguistic utterances.5 I will remain neutral on these 
two options. I shall assume that thoughts are complexes of concepts and that the contents of 
thoughts are Russellian propositions, that is, structured entities constituted by individuals and 
properties.6 Some philosophers characterize concepts as Fregean senses and thoughts as complexes 
of Fregean senses.7 Despite this crucial difference, my arguments are consistent with a broadly 
Fregean approach. Other philosophers prefer to speak of mental files.8 What I shall say here can be 
easily translated into the mental-file framework too. I shall use quotation marks to mention linguistic 
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expressions (“I”) and italics to mention mental representations (I). Whenever I speak of the self-
concept, it can be understood either as a name or an indexical. I shall use “self-thoughts” to denote 
thoughts that feature tokens of the self-concept understood in either of these two ways. 
 
I. The Millian View 
 
Philosophers have often suggested that a mental name could play the functional role of the self-
concept. To illustrate, Evans denies that “self-conscious thought would be beyond the reach of 
those who […] had to refer to themselves with their own names.”9 It is unclear, however, how 
Evans would have developed the name view. By contrast, Ruth Millikan is explicit on this count. In 
a highly influential article, she writes: “So-called ‘essential indexicals’ in thought are indeed essential, 
but they are not indexical. It is not their semantics that distinguishes them but their function, their 
psychological role.”10 Focusing on the self-concept, Millikan suggests that it works like a name:  
 
Now it is trivial that if I am to react in a special and different way to the knowledge that I, RM, am 
positioned so in the world, a way quite unlike how I would react knowing anyone else was positioned 
so in the world, then my inner term for RM must bear a very special and unique relation to my 
dispositions to act. But what does that have to do with indexicality? My inner name “RM” obviously is not 
like other names in my mental vocabulary. It is a name that hooks up with my knowhows, with my 
abilities and dispositions to act, in a rather special way […]. My inner “RM” is indeed special. Let us 
call it @“RM,” or RM’s “active self name.” It names the person whom I know, under that name, how 
to manipulate directly; I know how to effect her behavior.11 
 
A few pages later, Millikan suggests that the self-concept is a Millian name whose content is 
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 THE MILLIAN VIEW 
MILLIAN CLAIM. The self-concept is a mental representation that lacks an indexical 
semantics. Instead, the self-concept should be construed as a Millian name. 
FUNCTIONAL ROLE CLAIM. What distinguishes the self-concept from other names is its 
functional role.  
 
I shall criticize the Millian view. I do think, however, that my arguments could be generalized to 
other semantic accounts of names. Nevertheless, I leave for another occasion the discussion of these 
views.13  
 
II. The Indexical View 
 
The most natural way of opposing the Millian view is to reject the Millian claim and argue that the 
self-concept has an indexical semantics.14 So, one might argue that the self-concept has a de se 
content.15 This strategy is so intuitive that recent de se skepticism has focused on de se contents.16 
Nevertheless, I have suggested that the contents of thoughts are Russellian propositions. Therefore, 
I must draw the distinction between the I-concept and the self-name in a different way.  
There are many asymmetries between linguistic and mental representations. These 
asymmetries will become important when we discuss some objections to the indexical view (Section 
VI). Despite these asymmetries, however, we can try to identify a constitutive mark of any indexical 
representation. To this end, it will be useful to consider an indexical rule for the I-concept:  
 
RR REFLEXIVE RULE. A token of I in a thinking stands for the subject of that thinking.17 
 
We want RR to be consistent with different metaphysical accounts of subjects. So, we will only 
assume that a subject is a possessor of mental states and events.18 We can think of RR as an informal 
statement of the relation that a subject must bear to a token of I in order to be the referent of that 
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token.19 Consider my thought He is talking to me. Why did my token of me refer to me and not to the 
angry teacher, Laura or Paul? RR offers a straightforward answer: I was the only subject who was in 
a thinking relation to my token of me. 
What makes RR a paradigmatic example of an indexical rule? My suggestion is that RR spells 
out a relation between an entity that instantiates a contextual property and a representation-token. 
Call this an “indexical relation.” The first relatum is a thinking subject. Presumably, subjects engage 
in thinking in some but not all contexts. The second relatum is a representation-token.20 
Consider now a Millian rule for the mental name Santiago: 
 
MR MILLIAN RULE. Santiago stands for Santiago. 
 
MR codifies a relation that links a referent and a mental name. The first relatum is Santiago, 
independently of whether Santiago instantiates a contextual property. The second relatum is a 
concept-type. Therefore, MR does not codify an indexical relation. For ease of exposition, we can 
say that MR codifies a “Millian relation.”21  
 We can now see what a successful argument against the Millian view would look like: it 
should show that the reference of the self-concept is determined by a rule that codifies an indexical 
relation. In the case of RR, that indexical relation connects a thinking subject with a token of the 
self-concept. We have seen, however, that the Millian view distinguishes the self-name from other 
names by its functional role (Section I). So, we should offer a partial characterization of the 
functional role of the self-concept.22 
 
III. The Functional Role of the Self-Concept 
 
Many philosophers think that we can integrate various pieces of self-concerning information without 
deploying a self-concept. Here is John Perry: 
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For many purposes we don’t need notions of ourselves at all. Consider the simple act of seeing a 
glass of water in front of one and drinking from it. The perceptual state corresponds to a relation 
between an agent and a glass of water. It is the state an agent is typically in when there is a glass of 
water in front of that agent. […] The identity between the perceiver and the agent is (normally) 
guaranteed outside of thought, by the “architectural” relations between the eyes and arms. One need 
not keep track of it in thought.23  
 
Perry’s example is not uncontroversial. Nevertheless, it illustrates a common worry. It might turn 
out that some forms of perception-action coordination involve no representations at all (think of simple 
forms of conditioned behavior). Others might involve representations but no self-representation. And 
still others might involve only non-conceptual self-representations.24 
 A central philosophical task is to spell out the conditions under which it becomes necessary 
for a subject to deploy non-conceptual and conceptual self-representations. It would take us too far 
afield to address this issue here.25 Instead of tackling this question, I will highlight some aspects of 
the functional role of the self-concept that are not prey to Perry’s line of thought. On the view I 
shall recommend, the self-concept makes self-concerning information from various channels 
available for use in inference. Given that concepts are mental representations that can participate in 
inference, it is not unreasonable to hold that this device—the self-concept—works as a concept.26 
I will use the first-person pronoun to describe the functional role of the self-concept. 
However, my use of the first person should be understood as an expository convenience; it will 
leave open the possibility that the self-concept is a Millian name. I shall proceed in two steps. First, I 
will introduce a rough distinction between two types of information channels. Second, I will use that 
distinction to offer a partial characterization of the functional role of the self-concept. 
III.1. Reflexive and Non-Reflexive Channels. Self-thoughts are typically responses to input 
conditions. In the angry teacher scenario, my thought He is talking to me was a response to the 
teacher’s utterance: “Please, leave the room!” We will need a rough characterization of these input 
conditions. To this end, I will introduce a distinction between reflexive and non-reflexive channels: 
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REFLEXIVE CHANNELS. If an information channel, Cr, always delivers information of a 
subject, S, then Cr is a reflexive channel relative to S.  
NON-REFLEXIVE CHANNELS. If an information channel, Cn, does not always deliver 
information of a subject, S, then Cn is a non-reflexive channel relative to S.27 
 
Plausible examples of reflexive channels are proprioception and introspection. In normal conditions, 
my proprioceptive system always delivers information of the position and movement of my body. 
Therefore, my proprioceptive system is a reflexive channel relative to me. In normal conditions, 
introspection always delivers information of my own mental states and events. Therefore, 
introspection is a reflexive channel relative to me.28 
Examples of non-reflexive channels include mirrors and written and spoken utterances. In 
normal conditions, mirrors deliver information of my appearance but also of the appearance of 
other things. That is why I can fail to recognize my own image in a mirror. Therefore, mirrors are 
non-reflexive channels relative to me. In normal conditions, written and spoken utterances do not 
always deliver information of me. Indeed, they often deliver information of other people, the 
weather or the political situation. Thus, written and spoken utterances are non-reflexive channels 
relative to me.  
There are mixed cases as well. My visual experiences often deliver information of things 
other than me, such as a cup on the table or Peter approaching. If we focus on those contents, 
vision counts as a non-reflexive channel. Nevertheless, all visual experiences are also centered on the 
perceiver.29 Hence, although visual experiences do deliver information of entities other than the 
perceiver, there is a sense in which visual experiences always carry information of the perceiver. 
When I see a cup on the table, the location of the cup is fixed in relation to me. When I see Peter 
approaching, the direction of Peter’s movement is also fixed in relation to me. Given its egocentric 
character, vision counts as a reflexive channel.30  
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To be sure, a lot more could be said on reflexive and non-reflexive channels. However, this 
rough characterization is all we need to offer a partial description of the functional role of the self-
concept.  
III.2. Introduction and Consumption Rules. We can use our two types of information channels to 
describe two “introduction rules” for the self-concept.  
ARTICULATION. Self-thoughts can be used to make explicit the subject in response to self-
concerning information originating from a reflexive channel. If I see a ball flying toward me, I can 
think That ball is approaching me. In this case, the self-concept articulates the subject of my visual 
experience. 
ANCHORING. When the subject is provided with self-concerning information from a non-
reflexive channel, self-thoughts enable the subject to anchor that information. In anchoring, 
information from a signal that could potentially carry information of different things gets 
“translated” into a self-thought, that is, a representation that features at least one token of the self-
concept. Recall the angry teacher scenario. I parsed the imperative “Please, leave the room!” That 
imperative could potentially concern Laura or Paul. However, I excluded those hypotheses and 
thought He is talking to me.  
Here is a schematic representation of the two introduction rules: 
 
Articulation     Anchoring 
A signal from a reflexive channel   A signal from a non-reflexive channel  
------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------ 
Self-thought     Self-thought 
 
We shall not describe “elimination rules” for self-thoughts. There are two reasons for this 
decision. First, we shall remain neutral on the nature of the immediate precursors of action. Second, 
there are good reasons to think that self-thoughts are connected with other thoughts. So, we will 
rather describe two “consumption rules.”  
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 PRACTICAL CONSUMPTION. The angry teacher scenario illustrates a typical effect of self-
thoughts. Articulated and/or anchored self-concerning information can be used in a practical 
inference. When the teacher shouted “Please, leave the room!”, I thought He is talking to me and 
formed the intention to leave the room. Yet, that self-thought only led me to form the intention to 
leave the room because it was embedded in a broader inferential network. That inferential network 
plausibly included a desire to follow the order and the visually based thought: The exit is over there. 
 THEORETICAL CONSUMPTION. We also use the self-concept to perform theoretical 
inferences. After the publication of the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant presumably indulged in the 
following train of thought: I am a philosopher. I am old. I am an old philosopher now! Transitions of this 
sort may be integrated into a self-conception. A self-conception is a long-standing representation of 
ourselves that includes information about our own birthday, our place of origin, our relatively stable 
physical properties, and our deepest convictions and values. We can think of self-conceptions as 
inferential networks, crystallizations of previous self-thoughts. If Kant’s self-conception included a 
representation of being the author of the Critique of Practical Reason, it was probably because he once 
thought I am the author of the Critique of Practical Reason.  
Here is a schematic representation of the two consumption rules: 
 
Practical consumption    Theoretical consumption 
Self-thought     Self-thought 
------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------ 
Practical inference    Theoretical inference 
 
IV. Two Explanatory Tools 
 
I shall argue that an indexical rule like RR provides a better explanation of the (broad) functional 
role of the self-concept than the Millian rules that spell out the semantics of Millian names. To this 
end, I will introduce two explanatory tools: the relations-explain-success principle (RES PRINCIPLE) 
and the proportionality principle (PROPORTIONALITY). These explanatory tools are quite popular in 
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the literature on mental representation. As we shall see, Millikan herself employs these tools in her 
own account of mental representation. However, these tools have been largely ignored in the 
literature on indexicality.31 
 
IV.1. The RES principle. 
RES PRINCIPLE. The relation a representation stands in to its represented domain explains 
why that representation successfully plays its broad functional role.32 
 
Functional roles can be narrowly or broadly individuated. A functional role is broadly individuated 
just in case its inputs and outputs include relations that “reach out” into the world.33 It is narrowly 
individuated otherwise. The RES PRINCIPLE is restricted to broadly individuated functional roles.  
The RES PRINCIPLE is highly intuitive. We can appreciate its intuitive force with an analogy. 
The broad functional role of a map is to help us find our way in a given environment. Crucially, the 
relation of a map to the mapped domain explains why a normal map-user manages to find her way 
in a given environment. Imagine that Hannah and Pierre are trying to find a restaurant in New York 
City (NYC). Hannah is using a map of NYC. Pierre is using a map that a crazy joker gave to him. 
Unbeknownst to Pierre, he was given a map of Paris marked as a map of NYC. Suppose now that 
Hannah and Pierre are equally good map-readers. Suppose also that all other things are equal. If 
Hannah were to find the restaurant, we could explain Hannah’s successful outcome by saying that 
her map stands in a mapping relation to NYC. By contrast, if Pierre’s search was unsuccessful, we 
could explain Pierre’s unsuccessful outcome by saying that Pierre’s map of Paris does not stand in a 
mapping relation to NYC. Had Pierre found the restaurant, we could say that Pierre’s successful 
outcome was an accident. 
 One could think of semantic rules as ways of spelling out the sorts of relations that a 
representation bears to the represented domain.34 Some of these relations characterize reference and 
truth conditions. Therefore, given the RES PRINCIPLE, reference and truth are explanatorily prior to 
(broad) functional role.35 
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To be sure, defenders of conceptual role semantics have denied that reference and truth are 
explanatorily prior to (broad) functional role.36 My initial reaction to these views is to insist that the 
RES PRINCIPLE is highly intuitive. Moreover, I have two responses to these authors. First, those who 
are sympathetic to conceptual role semantics can read this article as a defense of a conditional claim: 
If the RES PRINCIPLE is true, the self-concept is plausibly understood as a mental indexical. Second, 
Millikan herself rejects conceptual role semantics and relies on the RES PRINCIPLE in her own 
account of mental representation.37 Therefore, our reliance on the RES PRINCIPLE does not beg the 
question against Millikan.38 
Millikan’s reliance on the RES PRINCIPLE is apparent in her frequent comparison of mental 
representations to maps. Moreover, the same commitment is apparent in her influential example of 
the waggle dance of honeybees. Successful foraging honeybees often perform a dance involving a 
small “waggle” pattern. This dance enables them to share information about the distance and 
direction of a source of nectar. This dance may cause other bees to fly off to the location of flowers 
bearing nectar. According to Millikan, different elements of the dance map onto different elements 
of the represented domain.39 Roughly, the duration of the dance stands for the distance of nectar 
from the hive and the angle of the dance to the vertical stands for the direction of nectar from the 
hive. Based on these observations, Millikan contends that the waggle dance maps onto the state of 
affairs required to guide the bees when they search for nectar in response to the waggle dance. 
Crucially, searching for nectar in response to the waggle dance is part of the broad functional role of 
the waggle dance. Therefore, Millikan’s analysis of the waggle dance illustrates her commitment to 
the RES PRINCIPLE. 
To be sure, the waggle dance is not a mental representation. However, Millikan thinks that 
mental representations display a similar structure. Instead of being produced and consumed by 
different organisms, mental representations are produced and consumed by different parts or 
aspects of the same subject. 
It might be objected that Millikan’s account is embedded within a teleosemantic theory of 
representation. So, our account of the waggle dance is at best incomplete. Millikan would insist that 
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the waggle dance has the etiological function of mapping the nectar-sun-hive domain in a specific 
way. This point is well taken. However, the RES PRINCIPLE is logically independent from 
teleosemantics. Therefore, we can safely ignore teleosemantics and focus on the RES PRINCIPLE. 
This approach has an advantage: even if teleosemantics is false, we can still rely on the RES 
PRINCIPLE to elucidate the self-concept.40 
IV.2. Proportionality. It is not easy to tell in the abstract when an explanation is good or bad. 
Nevertheless, once we agree on an explanandum and are confronted with various competing 
explanations, we are quite good at telling whether a given explanation is better or worse than other 
explanations. Consider the question: “Why did Johnny die?” Suppose that we are offered three rival 
explanations:  
 
E1. Poor Johnny was hit by an object.  
E2. Poor Johnny was hit by a bus.  
E3. Poor Johnny was hit by a bus travelling at the speed of light.  
 
Let us suppose now that some buses could travel at the speed of light. However, we live in a world 
where it is very rare for a bus to travel that fast. In this explanatory context, E2 provides a better 
explanation of Johnny’s death than E1 and E3. The intuition behind this assessment is that E2 
provides the right degree of specificity. E1 is not specific enough. Indeed, E1 is compatible with a 
situation in which Johnny was hit by a very light object (such as a pillow), so Johnny did not die. By 
contrast, E3 is overly specific. Had Johnny been alerted by his mother that a bus was approaching, 
he could have escaped his tragic death. But E3 wrongly predicts that Johnny could have not escaped 
his tragic death. Therefore, E3 is overly specific; it connects the two events more tightly than they 
were actually connected in the actual world.  
We can therefore say that our explanatory practices are governed by a principle of 
proportionality: 
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PROPORTIONALITY. Explanatory facts or properties must be proportional to their 
explananda.41 
 
We want explanations that are neither unspecific, nor overly specific.  
PROPORTIONALITY does not give us a magical recipe to identify good explanations. The 
suggestion is rather that our comparisons of rival explanations are governed by the regulative idea of 
PROPORTIONALITY. To simplify a bit, we can think of the explanandum as a set of phenomena that 
we are pre-theoretically inclined to group together. Minimally, an explanation seeks to identify a fact 
or property that correlates with that set of phenomena better than other known facts or properties.  
We shall rely on PROPORTIONALITY in our explanatory argument. Before that, we will need 
to see how PROPORTIONALITY interacts with the RES PRINCIPLE. 
IV.3. Relations, Success, and Proportionality. The RES PRINCIPLE says that the relation a 
representation stands in to its represented domain explains why that representation successfully 
plays its broad functional role (Section IV.1). The RES PRINCIPLE enables us to capture the contrast 
between cases in which an activity is controlled by a representation that stands in a suitable relation 
to a given domain (for example, using a map of NYC to find one’s way in NYC) with cases in which 
there is no suitable relation (for example, using a map of Paris to find one’s way in NYC). Some 
maps have the property of mapping a given domain; that is why they are good navigational tools.  
PROPORTIONALITY enables us to compare different hypotheses about how a representation 
relates to a given domain. Suppose that we have been spying on Hannah. We know that she has 
been using a map of NYC to find her way in the city. But we do not know which map she has been 
using. Our first hypothesis is that Hannah has been using an up-to-date map of NYC. Our second 
hypothesis is that she has been using an old map she found in her father’s tourist guide from 1997. 
Although both maps would enable Hannah to find her way in the city, each hypothesis yields 
different predictions of her navigational success. Were Hannah to be using the 1997 map, she would 
sometimes fail to find some restaurants that have disappeared since 1997 and overlook the existence 
of the most recent subway lines.  
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The RES PRINCIPLE helps us explain Hannah’s navigational success in both cases. 
PROPORTIONALITY helps us explain the difference in her success rates given the slightly different 
relation that each map bears to NYC. In the 1997 map, some dots for restaurants have no 
corresponding restaurant in the city and the most recent subway lines lack corresponding lines on 
the map. More generally, the different ways in which the two maps relate to NYC are proportional 
to Hannah’s different success rates. A good explanation of these different success rates should 
identify the differences between the relations that each map bears to the city. 
We will employ the same type of argument against Millikan’s Millian view. Millian rules do 
not yield proportional explanations of the broad functional role of the self-concept. Indeed, we have 
good reasons to think that RR¾or a similar indexical rule¾spells out the sort of relation that we 
need to offer a good explanation of activities that hinge on articulation and anchoring. 
 
V. The Explanatory Argument 
 
Many explanatory arguments have been proposed in the literature on the essential indexical. Some of 
those arguments point out that indexicals enable us to capture sameness of beliefs and desires 
among agents who are motivated to act in the same way.42 Others focus on the transition from no-
action to action, as when Perry’s messy shopper thinks I am making a mess, stops, and rearranges the 
torn sack.43 These issues are important. However, the explanatory argument I shall provide is 
different. It seeks to explain, via a hypothesis about the semantics of the self-concept, a non-
accidental pattern. This pattern consists of episodes of anchoring and mental events like forming an 
intention to act.44  
Let us assume that we have a semantic account of predicate concepts, negation, conjunction, 
and so on. Thus, whenever we have a self-thought, we know what the content of the predicative 
component is. Our task is to show that, unless tokens of the self-concept conform to an indexical 
rule, we could not offer a good explanation of the broad functional role of the self-concept. I will 
proceed in two steps. First, I will argue that the Millian view does not provide a proportional 
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explanation of the broad functional role of the self-concept. Second, I will suggest that the indexical 
view does provide a proportional explanation of the broad functional role of the self-concept. 
V.1. The Millian View. When the angry teacher screamed “Please, leave the room!” I engaged 
in anchoring: I thought He is talking to me. Since I wanted to comply with the order, I formed the 
intention to leave the room. So, the following fact obtained in the classroom: 
 
LEAVING. The subject who tokened a self-concept (Santiago) then formed the intention to 
leave the room.45 
 
There are reasons to think that LEAVING was not an accident. First, there were neither magical 
tricks, nor angels in the room; only ordinary causal relations. Second, it is easy to cite similar 
situations where a similar fact obtained. Here is an example. This morning, I went to a coffee shop 
and ordered a hot latte. After a few minutes, the barista shouted: “Santiago, hot latte!” Being aware 
that I had ordered a hot latte, I thought My latte is ready. I saw a big cup marked “Santiago” waiting 
on the counter, approached the counter, and grabbed the cup. In this situation, the following fact 
obtained: 
 
GRABBING. The subject who tokened a self-concept (Santiago) then formed the intention to 
grab the cup.  
 
LEAVING and GRABBING have something in common: a token of a self-concept is followed by an 
intention that seems to be relevant to the thinker of the prior token of the self-concept. It is easy to 
come up with similar correlations. Those correlations seem to be part of a pattern. That pattern cries 
out for an explanation. 
Here is my argument in a nutshell. These non-accidental correlations are instances of the 
broad functional role of the self-concept. Given the RES PRINCIPLE, we should explain those 
correlations with a rule that codifies a suitable relation between the self-concept and its referent. The 
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Millian relation that connects a Millian name with its referent yields an unspecific explanation. If that 
Millian relation is supplemented with a direct connection with abilities and dispositions to act, as 
Millikan suggests, we get an overly specific explanation. 
Suppose that the self-concept is a Millian name. This view faces a problem: the Millian 
relation is not specific enough to explain the target pattern: a token of a self-concept is followed by 
an intention that seems to be relevant to the thinker of the prior token of the self-concept. We can 
illustrate this point by comparing LEAVING (C1) with an alternative fact (C2): 
 
Context Millian Rule Facts 
C1 Santiago stands for 
Santiago 
Santiago thought He is talking to me & Santiago formed the intention to leave 
the room 
C2 Santiago stands for 
Santiago 
Santiago thought He is talking to Santiago & Santiago did not form the intention 
to leave the room 
 
Suppose that Santiago masters the Millian name Santiago in context C2. Therefore, the Millian 
relation that links Santiago to Santiago holds in C2. However, Santiago ignores the identity I = 
Santiago. Therefore, Santiago thinks the Millian name Santiago but does not form the intention to 
leave the room.  
This case is structurally similar to explanation E1 of Johnny’s death. The property of being 
hit by an object is instantiated when Johnny is hit by a pillow. However, Johnny could be hit by a 
pillow and not die. Similarly, the Millian relation that connects the Millian name Santiago with 
Santiago is instantiated in context C2. Still, Santiago does not form the intention to leave the room. 
Therefore, there are contexts in which the Millian relation is instantiated, but Santiago does not form 
the relevant intention. Assuming that LEAVING is an instance of the broad functional role of the self-
concept, it follows that the Millian relation yields an unspecific explanation of the broad functional 
role of the self-concept. 
 The Millian theorist needs to exclude context C2. To this end, she can insist that the self-
name differs from other Millian names in its narrow functional role. As Millikan puts it, the self-
name “hooks up with… my abilities and dispositions to act.”46 Given this amendment, there could 
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be no situation in which the Santiago-thinker ignores the identity I = Santiago. Upon thinking a 
Santiago-thought, Santiago is immediately disposed to act in some ways. So, the Millian theorist can 
exclude context C2 by distributing the explanatory burden between the Millian relation that connects 
the self-name with its referent and its narrow functional role. The Millian view adds a narrow 
functional role because it introduces a direct connection between the self-name and some abilities 
and dispositions to act, and this direct connection does not need to reach out into the world 
(Section IV.1).  
 This solution can discriminate LEAVING from context C2. In C1, Santiago’s self-thought He 
is talking to Santiago was underwritten by a Millian name that was directly connected with Santiago’s 
abilities and dispositions to act. Therefore, it is no surprise that Santiago formed the intention to 
leave the room. In C2, Santiago’s thought He is talking to Santiago was underwritten by an ordinary 
Millian name. Ordinary names are not directly connected with the subject’s abilities and dispositions 
to act. That is why Santiago did not form the intention to leave the room in C2. 
 Notice, however, that this response imposes an ad hoc restriction on the RES PRINCIPLE. This 
is a problem for someone like Millikan, who relies on the RES PRINCIPLE in her own theory of 
representation (Section IV.1). Her Millian view leads to a disunified account of mental 
representation. More importantly, the resulting account is unsatisfactory, for it yields an overly 
specific explanation of the broad functional role of the self-concept. To see why, let us examine two 
other contexts: 
 
Context Millian Rule Facts 
C3 Santiago stands for 
Santiago 
Santiago thought He is talking to me & Santiago formed the intention to stay in 
the room 
C4 Santiago stands for 
Santiago 
Santiago thought He is talking to me & Santiago thought: When is he going to stop 
bullying me? 
 
The Millian theorist explains the broad functional role of the self-concept by associating it with a 
Millian rule and introducing a direct connection between the self-concept and the subject’s abilities 
and dispositions to act. However, this strategy cannot easily accommodate contexts C3-C4, where 
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Santiago lacks a disposition to leave the room. In C3, Santiago wanted to challenge the teacher’s 
authority. So, upon thinking He is talking to me, he formed the intention to stay in the room. In C4, 
Santiago’s first self-thought led him to retrieve some old memories of past bullying. Those memories 
motivated Santiago to raise a question: When is he going to stop bullying me? Millikan’s Millian view is 
structurally similar to explanation E3 of Johnny’s death. The property of being hit by a bus travelling 
at the speed of light is overly specific. It connects the two events more tightly than they were 
actually connected. This view predicts that Johnny could have not escaped his tragic death. Similarly, 
the conjunction of the Millian relation and direct connections with dispositions and abilities to act is 
overly specific. It excludes cases in which a self-thought is not directly connected with dispositions 
and abilities to act.  
 The Millian theorist might reply that the disposition to leave the room can be “masked” by 
background desires and memories. So, contexts C3-C4 are not cases in which the subject lacks the 
disposition to leave the room. Instead, they are cases in which that disposition was not manifested. 
 Let us grant that dispositions can be masked. I do think, however, that this line of response 
misses the point of the second part of the argument. As early critics of behaviorism have pointed 
out, intelligent action often results from the interaction of different mental states and events.47 This 
explains why intelligent responses are highly flexible. To illustrate, Putnam imagined a population of 
super-Spartans that can suppress all pain behavior. “They do not wince, scream, flinch, sob, grit 
their teeth, clench their fists, exhibit beads of sweat, or otherwise act like people in pain... However, 
they do feel pain, and they dislike it (just as we do).”48 A moral of this example is that intelligent 
responses result from the complex interaction of various mental states and events. These 
interactions can result either in no-behavior at all or in a rich repertoire of different responses. 
Something similar occurs with self-thoughts, which interact in complex ways with other mental 
states and events. Notably, some of these interactions reflect a sensitivity of subsequent mental 
states and events to the first-personal character of prior self-thoughts. In C3, I thought that the 
teacher was talking to me and I wanted to challenge the teacher’s authority. That is why I formed the 
intention to stay in the room. In C4, my initial self-thought triggered an interrogative self-thought. 
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These complex interactions amongst self-thoughts explain why one and the same self-thought can 
have different outcomes in different contexts. Crucially, we cannot explain these complex 
interactions by merely insisting that the disposition to act in a certain way was masked in contexts 
C3-C4. Instead, we need an account in which tokens of the self-concept can bear semantically 
relevant relations to other self-thoughts before they lead to action. 
In sum, direct connections with abilities and dispositions to act can block cases in which 
Santiago does not act because he ignores the identity I = Santiago. However, this amendment 
introduces too tight a connection between tokens of the self-concept and action. The Millian 
theorist overlooks the important fact that self-thoughts can combine with other self-thoughts in 
inference. Given the inferential promiscuity of the self-concept, its connections with action are 
flexible. 
To be sure, a sufficiently imaginative philosopher could introduce another amendment to the 
Millian view. I won’t speculate about merely possible amendments. I will insist, however, that any 
amendment to the Millian view will inevitably weaken the force of the RES PRINCIPLE, a key tenet of 
Millikan’s own theory of representation. In what follows, I will argue that the indexical view has a 
straightforward response to the previous objection. This response has the merit of sticking to the 
RES PRINCIPLE. Thus, even if I do not manage to convince the skeptic, I will show that the indexical 
view of the self-concept is not a myth; pace Millikan, the indexical view has a lot going for it. 
V.2. The Indexical View. The indexical view can steer a middle course between unspecific and 
overly specific explanations. To see why, I will focus on RR. However, the argument also holds for 
slightly different formulations of the indexical rule that determines the reference of the I-concept 
(footnote 17). The argument goes as follows. The relation codified by RR is specific enough to 
exclude context C2. However, it is not as specific as combinations of a Millian rule with direct 
connections of the self-concept with abilities and dispositions to act. Therefore, RR does not 
exclude contexts C3-C4. 
RR tells us that a token of I in a thinking stands for the subject of that thinking. In other 
words, the referent of a token of I is the same as the thinker of that token. Given the RES 
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PRINCIPLE and PROPORTIONALITY, the activities that follow a token of I should be proportional to 
the relation of identity that connects a token of I with the thinker of that token. But, what would it 
take for subsequent activities to be proportional to that identity relation? Here is my proposal: all 
those activities should presuppose the identity of the referent of the token of I with the I-thinker. In 
this context, “activities” should be understood in a liberal sense, including bodily and mental acts. By 
contrast, if a bodily or mental activity does not presuppose the identity of the referent of the token 
of I with the I-thinker, that activity does not satisfy the RES PRINCIPLE and PROPORTIONALITY. 
Suppose that Perry thinks I am making a mess but keeps searching for the messy shopper. In 
this scenario, Perry has not engaged in an activity that presupposes the identity of the referent of the 
former token of I with the I-thinker. Instead, the subsequent activity presupposes that the referent 
of the token of I is different from the I-thinker. By contrast, if Perry then forms the intentions to 
stop, and rearrange the torn sack, he has engaged in activities that presuppose the identity of the 
referent of the former token of I with the I-thinker. 
This approach can discriminate context C1 from context C2. In C1, Santiago was the thinker 
of He is talking to me. Subsequently, he formed the intention to leave the room. That intention 
presupposed the identity of the referent of the former token of I with the I-thinker, Santiago 
himself. Suppose now that Santiago is an ordinary, Millian name. MR tells us that Santiago stands for 
Santiago. Suppose now that Santiago ignores that I = Santiago. So, upon thinking a Santiago-thought, 
Santiago is not disposed to engage in activities that presuppose the identity of the referent of Santiago 
with the Santiago-thinker. Why? The Millian rule for Santiago does not codify any identity relation 
between the Santiago-thinker and Santiago. Therefore, many activities that do not presuppose the 
identity of the token of Santiago and Santiago are proportional to the Millian relation. Of course, 
were the Santiago-thinker to know the identity I = Santiago, he would be disposed to engage in 
activities that presuppose the identity of the referent of the token of Santiago with the Santiago-
thinker. But this could be explained by the RES PRINCIPLE. Santiago knows the identity I = 
Santiago, and I is governed by a rule that codifies an identity relation between tokens of I and the 
thinker of those tokens. 
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When Santiago forms the intention to leave the room, he engages in an activity that 
presupposes the identity of the referent of a token of I with the I-thinker. However, this is not the 
only type of activity that presupposes that identity. Consider C3. If Santiago wants to challenge the 
teacher’s authority, forming the intention to stay in the room also presupposes the identity of the 
referent of the first token of I with the I-thinker, Santiago himself. Or consider C4. The initial self-
thought motivates Santiago to wonder: When is he going to stop bullying me? Santiago’s raising this 
question is not a disposition to leave the room. However, Santiago’s raising this question also 
presupposes the identity of the referent of the first token of I with the I-thinker, Santiago himself. 
Tokens of the self-concept are broadly relevant to the subject’s current projects. However, 
their relevance is not restricted to their connection with specific abilities or dispositions to act. The 
self-concept enables us to engage in a broad spectrum of bodily and mental activities. RR enables us 
to offer a proportional explanation of this broad spectrum of activities, for it explains the reference 
of the self-concept via a thinking relation that connects tokens of I with the I-thinker. All it takes for 
a downstream consequence of an I-thought to rely on the relation of a token of I with its referent is 
to presuppose the identity of the referent of the token of I with the I-thinker. That is why RR can, 
while MR cannot, explain the flexible functional role of the self-concept. 
 
VI. Objections and Replies 
 
Some philosophers might remain unconvinced. Isn’t it plainly obvious that someone—let us say a 
small child—could “coopt” her proper name to do what others do with the I-concept? Why insist 
that we should analyze her self-concept as a mental indexical?49 
This common line of argument rests upon a “syntactic fallacy.” The objector assumes that, 
because a subject can coopt an expression that has the syntactic properties of a proper name, the 
underlying mental representation belongs to the same semantic type as a proper name. Alas, this line 
of argument does not address the question at hand: whether the mental counterpart of a proper 
name in a subject’s thinking has the semantics of a proper name. 
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It might be objected that there is a key difference between linguistic indexicals and the self-
concept. Linguistic indexicals systematically shift their reference from context to context.50 By 
contrast, the self-concept does not seem to shift its reference from context to context. All my tokens 
of the self-concept refer to me and nobody else. So, the self-concept seems to be more similar to a 
proper name than to a linguistic indexical.51 
This argument has two main problems. First, it is one thing to say that the tokens of a 
representation-type exploit indexical relations to get their reference (indexicality); it is another thing 
to say that the reference of that representation-type shifts from context to context (shiftability). 
Shiftability provides good evidence for indexicality. However, there is no good reason to think that 
shiftability is necessary for indexicality. All we need to reject the Millian view is the weaker claim that 
an indexical rule determines the reference of tokens of the self-concept. Second, shiftability is a 
property of representation-types. Suppose now that the I-concept is individuated by its reference 
rule.52 This view predicts that different thinkers can master the same type of I-concept. If we 
consider various subjects who master the same type of I-concept, it follows that the self-concept 
does shift its reference. After all, this view entails that different tokens of the same concept-type (the 
I-concept) can refer to different subjects. Its seeming lack of shiftability is an illusion that arises 
from the fact that each subject has her own capacity to produce I-thoughts. But shiftabilty was never 
meant to be restricted to tokens of one individual capacity. It was meant to range over tokens of the 
same representation-type.53 
Millikan thinks that the self-concept cannot be an indexical because “what defines the 
indexical use of a sign is that its context is used by the interpreter to determine the content, to 
determine the referent, not talked about in the content.”54 Millikan develops this idea as follows: the 
interpretation of an indexical token always conjoins two independent sources of information: 
information about which token was produced and information about the context. Unfortunately, 
self-thinkers do not seem to conjoin two independent sources of information when they produce a 
self-thought. Consider Perry’s shopper case.55 When Perry thinks I am making a mess, he does not 
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need to conjoin information about which token he produced with information about who thought I. 
Perry simply thought a self-thought that disposed him to stop and rearrange the torn sack.56 
Unfortunately, Millikan’s characterization of indexicality is more demanding than it needs to 
be. We have granted that there are differences between linguistic and mental representations 
(Section II). Yet, this does not undermine a theoretically relevant similarity: both linguistic and 
mental indexicals get their reference via an indexical relation to their referent. This point generalizes 
to non-linguistic representations. Cognitive psychologists would not reject the existence of mental 
maps on the ground that a normal map-user needs to compare marks on a map with landmarks in 
the environment. When a cognitive psychologist posits the existence of mental maps, she is 
interested in a more abstract property that some mental structures share with public maps: a 
mapping relation between a mental vehicle and the environment that preserves some spatial 
relations. By parity of reasoning, all we need to refute the Millian view is the weaker claim that the 
reference of the self-concept is determined by an indexical relation.  
To be sure, we do have another self-representation that seems to work like a proper name. I 
called this representation a “self-conception” (Section III). To repeat, a self-conception is a long-
standing representation of ourselves that includes information about our own birthday, our place of 
origin, our relatively stable physical properties, and our deepest convictions and values. We can see 
our self-conception as the repository of information incorporated via articulation and anchoring. 
Given their stability over time, self-conceptions might have a Millian semantics.57 Yet, insofar as we 
acknowledge the existence of episodic self-thoughts that we use to articulate and anchor self-
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VII. The Essential Indexical 
 
Many philosophers have been interested in the question of whether indexicals are essential.58 Many 
of these authors cite Millikan’s seminal article as a precursor to current de se skepticism. Let me 
conclude with some ramifications of my discussion for the current debate. 
There are many intertwined issues in the debate on the essential indexical. The Millian view 
targets the claim that the self-concept has an indexical semantics. However, many philosophers are 
interested in other types of questions. Consider two representative examples: Are indexical 
representations necessary in our mental life? Is the I-concept necessary in our mental life? 
 In my view, meeting Millikan’s challenge is philosophically prior to answering the latter 
questions. If it makes little sense to hold that some mental representations have an indexical 
semantics, our answer to the latter questions should be “no.” That is why Millikan’s important paper 
has a central role in the current debate on the essential indexical. Furthermore, the tools one deploys 
to defend an affirmative answer to the former question will end up imposing substantial constraints 
on one’s answer to the latter questions. The explanatory argument shows that an indexical rule like 
RR provides a more proportional explanation of some patterns than the explanations provided by a 
Millian rule, even if that rule is combined with direct connections with abilities and dispositions to 
act. Nevertheless, this and other explanatory arguments have methodological limitations that will 
prevent us from demonstrating that the I-concept (or any other indexical concept) is metaphysically 
necessary.  
First, our explanatory argument relies on empirical observations of the broad functional role 
of a putative indexical concept. Even if these empirical observations are true, it is hard to show that 
the alleged broad functional role is constitutive of our mental life. Second, even if the alleged broad 
functional role is constitutive of our mental life, explanatory arguments could not demonstrate that 
the I-concept is metaphysically necessary to fulfill that role. Consider our descriptive claim that the self-
concept enables us to articulate and anchor information for use in practical and theoretical inference 
(Section III). Even if our explanatory argument is persuasive, some possible subjects could have 
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slightly different types of self-concepts. Think of subjects who possess an I*-concept that is 
governed by RR plus some weird condition, like raising one’s left hand. Nevertheless, these 
methodological limitations do not make explanatory arguments irrelevant to the issues raised by the 
problem of the essential indexical. We could see explanatory arguments as providing non-
demonstrative considerations in favor of a relative claim: indexical concepts are metaphysically 
necessary to fulfill some functional roles. 
 Philosophers have often argued that indexical concepts are necessary for action.59 Many 
critics have rejected this claim (footnote 24). I have suggested that the self-concept enables us to 
engage in complex forms of information integration from reflexive and non-reflexive channels for 
subsequent use in inference. This provides a new perspective on Perry’s shopper case. For Perry, the 
indexical belief I am making a mess was meant to explain his stopping and rearranging the torn sack.60 
Our treatment suggests a different analysis. Perry had information that someone was making a mess. 
He gained that information through the non-reflexive aspect of vision (Section III.1) conjoined with 
assumptions about supermarkets and sacks of sugar. Perry then noticed that the trail of sugar was 
becoming increasingly thicker, until it “dawned on him” that he himself was the shopper he was trying 
to catch. What happened at the epiphany? Perry engaged in anchoring. He formed an I-thought in 
response to information from a channel that also delivers information of other people. However, 
Perry’s I-thought did not need to have any direct connections with action. He could have simply 
formed another thought (for example, Oh, I’m so clumsy!). Or he could have stored his I-thought into 
his self-conception (for example, I once made a mess with a torn sack of sugar). 
Cappelen and Dever attack what they call the “Impersonal Incompleteness Claim” (IIC). 
Roughly, impersonal action explanations are necessarily incomplete because of a missing indexical 
component.61 Cappelen and Dever insist that impersonal action explanations can also offer action 
explanations. Although we have not discussed the explanations Cappelen and Dever are interested 
in, our explanatory argument enables us to grant Cappelen and Dever’s point without endorsing 
their skepticism about mental indexicals. You can certainly explain Johnny’s death by citing the fact 
that he was hit by an object. However, this explanation is not as good as another explanation that 
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cites the fact that Johnny was hit by a bus. Similarly, you can explain my forming the intention to 
leave the room by citing the fact that Santiago produced a thought that included a token of a 
concept that refers to Santiago. This explanation would not discriminate between the Millian view 
and the indexical view. Unfortunately, this explanation would not be as good as another explanation 
that introduced an indexical concept governed by an indexical rule like RR, for RR can, while MR 
cannot, discriminate context C1 from context C2. Moreover, RR predicts that the self-concept bears 
a flexible relation to action, as shown by contexts C3-C4. The issue is not whether impersonal 
explanations are available. The issue is whether they are as good as indexical explanations. If our 





The Millian view holds that the self-concept is not essentially indexical, for it is best construed as a 
Millian name that differs from other names in its narrow functional role. I have proposed an 
explanatory argument against the Millian view and in favor of the indexical view. The explanatory 
argument exploits some tools from the literature on mental representation: a principle that connects 
the relations of a representation to its represented domain with the capacity of that representation to 
fulfill its broad functional role (RES PRINCIPLE) and another principle that governs our explanatory 
practices (PROPORTIONALITY). Our explanatory argument does not focus on the usual explanatory 
facts, like detecting mental commonalities across subjects or explaining the transition from no-action 
to action. Our explanatory argument focuses on the relevance of semantic rules to explain some 
correlations between I-thoughts and subsequent mental events. These events include forming the 
intention to act, but also forming other thoughts, and storing self-concerning information in 
memory. Our explanatory argument does not stress that an indexical element must be added to non-
indexical explanations to turn them into complete explanations. It rather identifies some patterns 
that are best explained by indexical concepts. Our explanatory argument shows the explanatory 
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relevance of the indexical rule that fixes the reference of the self-concept, so it avoids the recent 
complaint that the problem of the essential indexical can be reduced to the problem of opacity for 
proper names. To be sure, this explanatory argument won’t convince those theorists who reject (one 
of) our explanatory principles. However, rejecting those principles would incur a serious cost for 
those theorists who think of reference and truth as explanatorily prior to broad functional role. 
Those who remain unconvinced can see the arguments presented here as a challenge. At the very 
least, they show that mental indexicals are not a myth. 
SANTIAGO ECHEVERRI 
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